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I. Introduction 
Monopolistic  competition  has  gained  a  renewed  interest  in 
economic theory. In the macroeconomic  field the question is asked 
whether monopolistic competition introduces Keynesian features 
into the model because firms face a demand constraint (e.g., Hart, 
1982;  Akerlof and  Yellen,  1985;  Blanchard and  Kiyotaki, 1987; 
van de Klundert and Peters, 1988). In the theory of international 
trade  imperfect competition  is  applied  to  explain  intrasectoral 
trade along with intersectoral trade (e.g., Dixit and Norman, 1980; 
Helpman, 1984;  Krugman, 1985;  Venables, 1985). As  such these 
models  are  helpful  in  understanding  the  consequences  of 
world-wide competition in specific commodity markets. 
The present paper introduces price-discriminating monopolists 
in  a  two-country  macroeconomic  model.  The  basic  idea  is 
considered in a seminal paper by Branson and Rotemberg (1980), 
but the microeconomic foundations of their model are not fully 
developed. As will be argued, this  leads to some confusion with 
regard to the role of relative commodity prices and terms of trade. 
Price-discriminating monopolists drive a  wedge between the real 
exchange rate (terms of trade) and relative consumers' prices. The 
consequences of such a divergence need to be carefully analysed. 
The two-country macroeconomic model which serves here as a 
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framework for the analysis of monopolistic competition is in the 
spirit  of equilibrium models as  studied among others by Lipton 
and Sachs (1983), Buiter (1984), van de Klundert (1986), Attanasio 
and van der Ploeg (1987).  It  may be  of interest to  compare the 
solutions  of  the  model  under  different  market  structures.  In 
addition, the more practical question may be asked in which way 
monopolistic  competition  determines  the  impact  of  shocks 
emanating  from  the  demand  side  or  the  supply  side  of  the 
economy. Import competition seems to a large extent price compe- 
tition, which may have far reaching consequences. As stated by a 
group of economists in a Report for the EEC: "To think about the 
issue  of import  competition, one  must  relax the  assumption  of 
perfect  competition  in  product  markets.  We  can  think  of  the 
problem most easily in terms of monopolistic competition, where 
each firm's demand depends on aggregate demand and the firm's 
price  relative to  the  industry average.  Import  competition here 
simply takes the  form of a  reduction in the  industry-wide price 
because  the  import  segment  of  the  industry  price  falls.  All 
domestic firms face an inward shift of their demand curve. They 
react by contracting output and  employment" (Blanchard et al., 
1985, pp. 12--13).  As  this  view  may be  influentially, it  may be 
worthwhile to scrutinize these and associated ideas by applying a 
more formal mode of analysis. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section 2  the  micro- 
economic foundations of the  model  are  given proper  attention. 
Consumer  behaviour  is  studied  in  section  2.1,  while  firm 
behaviour  is  examined  in  section 2.2. Applying  these  results  a 
two-country macroeconomic equilibrium  model  is  presented  in 
section3.1.  Some  differences  between  perfect  and  imperfect 
competition  are  reported  in  this  section.  Further  results  are 
obtained by a comparative static analysis. For this purpose a log- 
linear version of the model is presented in section 3.2. The impact 
of supply and demand shocks is analysed by solving this log-linear 
version  in  section 3.3. The  paper  closes  with  some  conclusions. 
2. Microfoundations of the Model 
2.1  Consumer  Behaviour 
Consumers have to  decide how much they will spend in the 
current period and how they will distribute that amount over the 
different commodities in the market. It will be assumed that both A Macroeconomic Two-Country Model  21 
decisions are separable and that the first decision has already been 
made. The amount to be spend on different commodities (cpc)  is 
therefore known. The consumption menu consists  of m domestic 
goods and m* foreign goods. Domestic goods are produced under 
identical  conditions  implying  that  they  can  be  aggregated.  The 
domestic country specializes  in  the  commodity indicated by the 
subscript 1.  Total  consumption  of  this  commodity  at  home  is 
denoted by ca. The foreign country specializes in commodity two. 
All foreign goods are also produced under the same technological 
conditions. Total demand for this commodity at home (import) is 
denoted by c2. The elasticity of substitution 07) between each pair 
of goods irrespective of their origin is the same, greater than one, 
and constant. The utility-index may then be written as" 
if=  m  +  m*~T]  ,  ],-1 
=  m,  cl  ~  +  m*~c2  ~  ,-1,  7]>1.  (2.1.1) 
Dividing through by (m + m *)~-~ the utility-index a  is transformed 
into: 
u=  a?el  ~  +(1-a)]c2~-  ,21,  (2.1.2) 
m 
where a = 
m+ m* 
The representative consumer in the domestic country chooses 
cl and e2 to maximize utility u subject to the budget constraint 
Cpc =  c~p~ +  c2p2,  (2.1.3) 
where p~ denotes the price of the domestic good and P2 denotes the 
price of the foreign or imported good. The first order conditions 
for a  maximum lead to the following solutions: 
ctc(p~ ) -,7  (2.1.4)  C1= 
ca =  ,  where  (2.1.5) 
1 
Pc =  [ap~-' +  (1 -  a)p~ -~] 1-,  (2.1.6) 
is the ideal definition of the general price-index. 
The corresponding equations in the foreign country, where we 
indicate variables with an asterisk, read 22  Th. van de Klundert: 
-+" 
\p* l  (2.1.7) 
cT =  ac* \p, ]  (2.1.8) 
l 
p* =  [(1- a)p~ a-,* + ap* a-"*] ~_~,.  (2.1.9) 
It  should be  observed that there are  m*  domestic goods and  m 
imported  goods  in  the  foreign  country  assuming  the  same 
consumption menu in both regions. 
2.2  Firm  Behaviour 
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)  each product is associated 
with a  single firm, which sets the price of its specific commodity. 
The number of firms is sufficiently large and each firm ignores the 
effect of its actions on the general price level. There is a  situation 
of monopolistic competition. However, the markets  at home and 
abroad are separated which opens the possibility of price discrimi- 
nation.  As  in  Branson  and  Rotemberg  (1980)  we  therefore 
postulate that the representative firm in each country behaves as a 
discriminating monopolist, charging different prices at home and 
abroad.  The  production  function  is  f(l),  with  f(1)>O  and  l 
denoting labour input. Profit maximization of domestic firms can 
then be formulated as 
max:  17  ---Pact + p* c* -  wl  (2.2.1) 
c I, cL* 
s.t.  ca +  c* =f(l),  (2.2.2) 
where  w  denotes  the  nominal  wage  rate.  Substitution  of  the 
inverted  demand  equations  according  to  (2.1.4),  (2.1.8)  and 
equation (2.2.2) in the profit relationship gives: 
1  1  1  1 
II=pc(aC)-~c~--~+p*(ac*)~c?l-~-wf-l(q+c~).  (2.2.1a) 
Maximization of equation (2.2.1 a) results after some manipulation 
in the following first order conditions: 
7/-1 
Pl f  (I) --- w  (2.2.3) 
7/ 
/7*--  t/* I p, f  (1) =  w.  (2.2.4) A Macroeconomic Two-Country Model  23 
The  corresponding  equations  for  the  foreign  discriminating 
monopolist can now be written as 
17"- lp~ f), (l'l= w* 
17" 
17--~11p2f~l (l*)= w*. 
17 
Under 
down  to  the  familiar  equality  of  the  real  wage  rate  and  the 
marginal product of labour. Under monopolistic competition firms 
realize a profit margin, which differs on internationally segmented 




perfect  competition  equations  (2.2.3)--(2.2.6)  come 
17"-1 
Pl_P2_  17"  =(* 




Rewriting equation (2.2.7)  as 
Pl  PT 
P2  P* 
it appears that the relative price consumers face is the same in both 
countries.  The  terms  of  trade  of  the  domestic  country  (real 
exchange rate)  are  equal to P!, whereas the reciprocal indicates 
P2 
the  terms  of trade  of the  foreign  country.  For  1< 17"< 7/  (and 
therefore (*< ~) we have 
P•  >Pl =P? > P2  (2.2.9) 
P2  P2  P~  P*" 
This result leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition  1.  The terms of trade  of the country where  monopolistic 
competition  is relatively  weaker,  because products are 
more homogeneous  than  in  the other country,  exceed 
1  Branson  and  Rotemberg  (1980) erroneously  assume  that  under 
monopolistic  competition  the  foreign  price  level  enters  the  demand 
function  for labour in the domestic country and vice versa for the other 
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the  price  ratio  consumers  are facing  at  home  and 
abroad. 
That  is  all  to  be  said  in  a  partial  equilibrium  setting.  To 
determine  the  relative  price  of both  goods  we  have  to  specify a 
general  equilibrium  model.  This  will  be  our  task  in  the  next 
section. 
3. A Macroeconomic Two-Country Model 
3.1  Specification  of the  Model 
General  equilibrium  in  a  two-country  model  of  the  format 
presented  in  section 2  requires  simultaneous  equilibrium  in  four 
markets:  two  goods  markets  and  two  labour  markets.  However, 
there are only three relative prices to do the job, i.e. the real wage 
rate  in both  countries  and  the  relative  price  of commodities  one 
and two. In the theory of international  trade it is usual to assume 
that  all  income  accrueing  from production  is  spent  on  commod- 
ities.  For  the  domestic  country  this  would  mean"  qpl+c~p*= 
c~pl+c2P2.  The  current  account  balances  and  one  could  invoke 
Walras'  law  to  eliminate  one  of  the  equations  requiring  equi- 
librium in the goods market.  The number of equations then corre- 
sponds to the number of unknown variables. 
In macroeconomic theory one would allow for disequilibrium 
on the current account. Indeed, the notion of intertemporal  choice 
refers  to  borrowing  and  lending,  which  could  take  the  form  of 
international  capital  movements.  Assuming  perfect  capital 
mobility the real interest rate would be uniform across countries. If 
spending  would  depend  on  the  interest  rate  there  would  be  an 
additional variable to equilibrate both goods markets. In a number 
of macroeconomic two-country models the demand for investment 
goods  is  supposed to be  a  function  of the  real  interest  rate  (e.g. 
Lipton and Sachs, 1983; Buiter, 1984; van de Klundert, 1986; Atta- 
nasio  and  van  der Ploeg,  1987).  Here, we shall  assume that  total 
consumption in both regions depends negatively on the real rate of 
interest. 
de 
c= c (r;_c),  -~r <0  (3.1.1) A Macroeconomic Two-Country Model  25 
de* 
c* = c* (r; _c*),  d---~-  < 0.  (3.1.2) 
The symbols _c and _c* indicate autonomous factors which may 
be conceived as multiplicative shift variables, which are equal to 
one in the initial equilibrium. Wealth effects (including gains and 
losses in the terms of trade) are omitted to make the analysis more 
tractable. 
Equilibrium in the market for goods can be formulated as 
f(1) = cl + c~  (3.1.3) 
f* (l*) = c* + c2.  (3.1.4) 
The supply of labour may be positively related to the real wage 
rate, which can be written as 
7  ) 
ls=l s  w.,  ],  ,  d(w/pc)>O  (3.1.5) 
*  )  ls-l~  ,  J*  ,  d(w./p.)  >0.  (3.1.6) 
Here also, the symbols _/s, _/* indicate multiplicative shift variables, 
which  are  equal  to  one  in  the  initial  situation.  In  equilibrium 
labour  supply  equals  labour  demand,  which  can  be  expressed 
formally as 
l=  Is  (3.1.7) 
z*  =  (3.1.8) 
The complete model consists of 18  equations:  (2.1.4)--(2.1.9), 
(2.2.3)--(2.2.6), and (3.1.1)--(3.1.8), which can be solved for the 18 
endogenous variables, viz. cl, c*,  c2, c*,  c, c*,  l, l*,  Is,  l*, Pl  P~  P2 
Pc'P*'Pc' 
p'~  w  w*  p~ 
and  r.  For  suitable  specifications  of  the 
pc' 
consumption functions and labour supply functions, for instance 
assuming constant elasticities, existence of an equilibrium can be 
proved in  a  straightforward manner. However, general existence 
theorems are beyond the scope o(the paper. 
Real wage rigidity and labour market disequilibrium (Phillips- 
curve)  can  be  introduced  rather  easily,  Nominal  wage  rigidity 
would also be  a  possibility  after the introduction of a  monetary 
sector.  However,  unemployment problems  are  not  our  primary 26  Th. van de Klundert." 
concern. We will therefore stick to the equilibrium version of the 
model and compare the situation of monopolistic competition with 
that of perfect competition. 
It is easy to proof the following result. 
Proposition 2.  If  labour  supply  is  exogenous  the  country  where 
monopolistic  competition  is relatively  weaker realizes 
higher terms of trade than under perfect competition￿9 
This proposition  follows from proposition 1 and the fact that 
with exogenous labour supply the relative price consumers face is 
independent of the market structure. The relative price P_2 which is 
P2 
equal to the terms of trade under perfect competition, follows in 
this case from equations (2.1.4)--(2.1.9) and (3.1.3)--(3.1.4). 
With endogenous labour supply this result does not hold. The 
solution of the model is then more complicated and linearization 
around an equilibrium solution will be  helpful to  obtain  further 
results. 
3.2 The  Log-linear  Version  of the  Model 
The equations can be linearized around a particular solution by 
taking total differentials. Indicating percentage deviations by a dot 
above the variable the linearized system may be written as: 
Home country 
4= ~- ~7(p2-p3 
Pc= opl + (1 -  o) P2 
pl+r 
p~'+ r  w 
~= -  ~i+_~ 
i~=v(w-pc)+L 
i=i~ 
The  elasticities  evaluated  at  the 
following meaning: 
Foreign country 
￿9  "  -  *  "*  "*  (3.2.1)  c~' =  c*  77  (P2  -Pc) 
~,* = ~*- 77* @7 -Pc*)  (3.2.2) 
pc* = O'p* + (1 -  O*)p~  (3.2.3) 
p* + (* -  e*/* = w*  (3.2.4) 
p* + r  -  e*/'* =  w*  (3.2.5) 
~* =  -  ~*i+ _~*  (3.2.6) 
[* =  v* (w*-p*) +_/'*  (3.2.7) 
fl* I* = #*~* + (1 -/z*) d2  (3.2.8) 
l* = l*.  (3.2.9) 
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If  ap] -'1 
/3=7<1  O  =  ap~-'7 + (1- a) p~ -'l 
lft  r  dc 
f  c  dr 
ct  w/pc  dl~, 
T  d(w/pc)"  Y 
<1 
It should be noted that  (  and  (*  relate to  shocks of a  particular 
kind. Under perfect competition we have ( = (* -- 1. Monopolistic 
competition  may then  be  seen  as  a  perturbation  of the  system 
under perfect competition, implying (,  (*< 1.  This  greatly facili- 
tates  a  comparison  of both  market structures.  The  elasticities  of 
substitution  (rl  and  r/*)  are  assumed invariant with respect to  a 
change in market structure. 
To make the model more tractable we assume that both regions 
have  a  number  of  structural  characteristics  in  common  in  the 
steady  state  before  the  model  is  exposed  to  shocks,  i.e.  fl=fl*, 
6= 6",  v= v* and ~:= ~:*. Ignoring for the time being other multi- 
plicative  shocks  (~=~*=/s=_/'*=O)  the  solution  for  the  relative 
price is, as shown in the Appendix: 
where 
(;-;,) 
Pl-P2 =  A +A*  1 
o* 
+  #*r/* (1 -  0*) +  (I -#*) r/O. 
A  -- fly(l-  O) 
1+6v 
A* =  fly(l-  0") 
l+6v 
From equations (3.2.4) and (3.2.5) it can be deduced that 
/~' -/~2 =  (Pl-?2)  +  (r  r  (3.2.11) 
What  is  at  stake  can  easily be  explained.  The  domestic country 
benefits  from  the  higher  profit  margins  abroad  through  trade. 
However, higher profit margins abroad induce a  larger reduction 
in supply of the foreign good compared with the decline in supply 
at  home. This  leads to  a  rise  of the relative price of the foreign 
good,  counteracting  the  first  mentioned  effect.  No  general 
conclusion seems possible, but it can be argued that for parameter 
values within a reasonable range the second effect mentioned will 
be smaller than the first one. For v~ oo the reciprocal of the coef- 
ficient inthe RHS of equation (3.2.10) reduces to 28  Th. van de Klunde~: 
[# (1- O)+ (1- #*)O] 77 + [#*(1- O*) + (1- #)O'177* 
(2- O- O*) + 
1-/~, 
Noting  that  e-  where  cr  denotes  the  elasticity  of substi- 
o- 
tution between labour and capital (cf. Layard and Walters, 1978), 
r/,  r/*> fl/e  holds  for  parameter  values  within  a  wide  range 
considered to be realistic. As a  result the expression given above 
will be greater than one and the coefficient in equation (3.2.10) will 
be smaller than one. The observation that the elasticity of labour 
supply found in econometric studies is usually small (below unity) 
strongly reinforces the argument. 
3.3  The  Impact  of Supply  and  Demand  Shocks 
It  should  be  observed  that  under  monopolistic  competition 
r162  0  unless  the  elasticities  of  demand  r/  and  11"  are  a 
function of other variables,  for instance the number of firms or 
total  demand.  However,  as  already  discussed  by  Chamberlin 
(1933) there is no clear reason why these elasticities should vary in 
a systematic manner with the number of firms. As Chamberlin puts 
it: ,,More  substitutes does not necessarily mean better  substitutes 
in a sense which would increase elasticities" (Ibid., p. 286). Layard 
and Nicketl (1985) hold a different view. In their opinion the elas- 
ticity 77 depends positively on aggregate demand, because oligopo- 
listic firms reduce the mark-up over marginal cost in booms. We 
will  not  follow this  argumentation, which seems  typical  ad-hoc. 
For constant values of 7/  and  r/* the log-linear version of the 
model under monopolistic competition looks formally the same as 
the  log-linear  version  under  perfect  competition.  However,  the 
original versions of the models lead to different solutions which is 
reflected in different values for a number of elasticity coefficients. 
Apart from this the market structure is important with respect to 
the transmission of shocks. The stories to be told are different. It is 
therefore instructive to  analyse the impact of supply shocks  and 
demand shocks in the present model. 
Equilibrium in the goods market and the labour market in the 
domestic  country  implies  a  relation  between  the  relative 
commodity price and the rate of interest. This relation is derived in 
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A (pl -p2) =  -  ~i + #_~ + (1- #)_d*  fl  ],.  (3.3.1) 
l+ev 
There is a  similar relation for market equilibrium abroad: 
&  A*(/il-/i2) =  ~t:-y*_~*-(1-#*)_~* +  _/*  (3.3.2) 
Solving for the relative price gives: 
p~-p:  =  --[(#  +#* -  1) (_~- _~*)  --  ('_Is-_[*)].  (3.3.3) 
A +k*  l+~v 
Turning  to  autonomous  changes  in  labour  supply  first,  the 
following proposition summarizes the result expressed in equation 
(3.3.3). 
Proposition  3.  A positive supply shock in the foreign country (_[* > O) 
raises  the terms of trade of the domestic country.  The 
real rate of interest declines  to eliminate excess supply 
of  goods in both markets. 
A  graphical  illustration  of  this  proposition  is  presented  in 
Fig. 1. A positive supply shock translates into a downward shift of 






Fig. 1.  Positive supply shock abroad 
This  may  occur  directly  (in  the  case  of  a  technological 
improvement) or indirectly as  the wage rate  falls  in  the  case  of 
excess  supply  in  the  labour  market.  Foreign  firms  lower  their 30  Th. van de Klundert: 
prices  and  sell  more  in  both  markets.  Domestic  firms  lose 
ground  because  of  a  more  severe  import  competition.  Labour 
demand  in  the  domestic  economy  declines  which  puts  a 
downward  pressure  on  wages.  Labour  supply  increases  simul- 
taneously,  because  the  real  wage  rate  (w/pc)  rises  as  the  price 
of  imported  goods  declines.  When  domestic  wages  fall 
producers  in  the  home  country  can  fight  back by lowering  their 
prices  and  increasing  output.  Excess  supply  of  goods  is 
distributed  internationally.  A  reduction  in  the  real  interest  rate 
then  becomes necessary to  restore  equilibrium  in  both  markets. 2 
The  relative  price  of  the  foreign  good  decreases,  as  might  be 
expected.  Output  increases  in  both  regions. 
A  demand shock in one country leads to a  shift of the market 
equilibrium  curves of both countries  as shown in Fig. 2a and 2b. 
The main implications  of a  demand shock are summarized  in the 
following proposition. 
Propostion 4.  A  positive  demand  shock  in  the  foreign  country 
(_~* > O)  leads to a  deterioration  of the terms of trade 
in the domestic country if there exists a  "home market 
bias" (It > 1-#*).  The real interest rate rises to choke 
off excess demand. 
The  meaning  of the  condition  #  >  1-#*  is  straightforward. 
The inequality states that there is a  "home market bias" such that 
the share  of domestic firms  exceeds the  share  of foreign firms  in 
the home market when the countries  are equal in size. A  demand 
pull  will  then  have  a  stronger  effect on  the  consumption  of the 
domestic good than on the imported good in the country where the 
shock applies.  A  similar condition is reported in Venables (1985), 
where  a  Cournot  model  is  applied  to  explain  intrasector  trade. 
Under  the  condition  stated  above  output  in  the  foreign  country 
rises,  while  output  in  the  domestic  country  falls.  Branson  and 
Rotemberg (1980) also note the possibility of an opposite outcome 
and call it the "Hong Kong" case. In their view it is related to the 
market structure of monopolistic competition. However, a demand 
pull in one country raises output in the other country when there is 
a  "foreign  market  bias"  whatever its  cause.  The  outcomes  for 
and #* depend on the relative size of countries and on the solution 
2 In a model with capital accumulation a supply shock may affect the 
marginal efficiency of capital. Under these circumstances the interest rate 
may rise as shown for instance in van de Klundert (1986). A Macroeconomic Two-Country Model  31 
for relative prices.  It is  through the latter effect that the market 
structure will be of influence. The different possibilities are illus- 
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Fig. 2 a.  Positive demand  shock 
abroad; normal case 
P•  P2 
Home ~ 
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Fig. 2b.  Positive demand  shock 
abroad;  "Hong Kong" case 
The result of a  demand pull can be explained as follows. On 
impact of a positive shock abroad firms operating in the foreign 
market  raise  their price  and  their  output.  There  will  be  excess 
demand  in  all  markets.  The  rate  of interest  rises  to  choke  off 
demand for goods.  Wages increase to  restore equilibrium in the 
labour market.  Prices in  both  countries rise.  For #  >  1-/z*  the 
terms  of  trade  of  the  foreign  country  improve,  implying  an 
increase in the supply of labour and the volume of output. In the 
home country labour supply and output decrease. 
4. Conclusions 
Price discriminating monopolists may drive a  wedge between 
the relative price of commodities and the terms of trade or real 
exchange  rate  in  a  macroeconomic two-country model.  In  the 
present  analysis  monopolistic  competition  relates  to  product 
differentiation. The higher the  elasticity of substitution  between 
goods the lower profit margins will be. In this sense competition is 
less severe. When the elasticity of substitution differs across coun- 
tries the terms of trade of the region where monopolistic compe- 
tition is less severe will be higher than under perfect competition. 32  Th. van de Klundert." 
If labour supply is endogenous output will be lower in both coun- 
tries. 
A positive supply shock in the foreign country raises the terms 
of trade of the domestic country (real exchange rate appreciation). 
A positive demand shock in the foreign country leads to a deterio- 
ration of the terms  of trade  at  home (real  exchange rate  depre- 
ciation), if there is a "home market bias". Output in the domestic 
country declines. In the opposite case of a "foreign market bias" a 
demand pull abroad raises output in the domestic economy. 
The  model  is  kept  rather  simple  and  could  be  extended  in 
several  directions.  Nominal  wage  rigidity  as  well  as  real  wage 
rigidity could be introduced to study problems of unemployment. 
The  microeconomic foundations  of  the  model  would  gain  by 
analysing intertemporal choice of consumers and producers. Fixed 
cost  could be  assumed to  explain the  number of firms  on long 
term. However, this would not fundamentally change the conclu- 
sions of the present analysis. 
Appendix 
From  equations  (3.2.3)  and  (3.2.4)  labour  demand  can  be 
written as: 
1  1 
1= --l(w-Pl)+-~=e  e  -  -(w-Pc- (1- O) (Pl-p2)) + ~  ~.e  (A.1) 
Equilibrium in the labour market in the domestic country implies 
1-O  1  e 
# -/~c =  1+  e~-~(pl-k)  + ~  r  l+e~v[S.  (A.2) 
Substitution of this result in (3.2.7)  gives 
i =  v (1-  o)  v  1 
l+ev  (Pl--P2)+ I--~evr  I-+~v [~"  (A.3) 
Equations (3.2.1)--(3.2.6) may be used to give 
4  =  --~/;-- 77(1-- O) (d01--/~2) "1- C  (A.4) 
0~ =  -- ~# /; -- ~* O* (j~l--P2) +  -C*"  (A.5) 
Substitution of equations (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) in the equilibrium 
relation for the goods market in the domestic country results in A Macroeconomic Two-Country Model  33 
-  [u~+(1-~)~*le 
t~ 
+~e+(7  -  u) _e*  +~vL 
1  1 ~eev ~"  (A.6) 
@ 
A  similar expression can be derived for equilibrium in the goods 
market in the foreign country: 
-  3u  +~*rl*O-o*)+O-~*)~o  G0~-pO= 
-  [~* ~* +  (1-#*)  ~l 
8"  /~* v*  . 
+  ~z* ~* +(1-~*)  ~- l+e,v,'!*  ....  ~*.  -  1+e'v* 
(A.7) 
The solution for the relative commodity price follows from equa- 
tions  (A.6)  and (A.7). Assuming fl=fl*,  c=e*,  v=v*  and  ff=~* 
the outcome can be simplified to 
1 
Pl-P2 -  [(#+/~*- 1) (_~- _~*) 
A+A* 
(L-l*)  ---~C~'  "  ;*)],  (A.8) 
1 + ev  1+ e v--- 
where 
~vO-o) 
,4 =  +/.tr/(1 -  O) +  (1 -,u)  7/* O* 
l+ev 
fly(1-  69") 
zl*  =  +  #* 7/*(1 -  0")  +  (1 -/.t*)  1/0. 
l+ev 
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